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A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR JOSEPH W.
MCKNIGHT: SHADES OF THE




ROFESSOR Joseph W. McKnight has been a wonderful friend and
colleague to me over the last several years. I think this is due in
large part to our mutual love of restoring old books and visiting
England. In fact, we sometimes combine our mutual interests by visiting
bookstores in London that specialize in old books and then restoring the
books upon our return to Dallas.
When I was in law school, in class one day, one of my professors men-
tioned an old English case that he referred to as The Highwayman's Case.
He gave us the details of the case, and I was fascinated by it but doubted
whether the case really existed. Knowing of Professor McKnight's love of
anything (especially history) related to England, I asked him about the
case, and he told me he was unfamiliar with it but would check on it and
get back to me. A couple of days later he gave me several articles
describing the case (apparently, it was a real case). I read the articles,
and although still fascinated by the case, did not see how a case like The
Highwayman's Case could possibly arise in this day and age, particularly
in my field of tax law. However, I was proven wrong by a recent case
involving corporate tax shelters.
Former Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers stated that
"[c]ombating abusive [corporate] tax shelters is perhaps the biggest chal-
lenge facing our tax administration today."' One of the primary reasons
combating abusive corporate tax shelters is so challenging is the lack of
information available to the government in terms of the type of tax shel-
ters that are being sold and the identity of the individuals or entities in-
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. I would like to
thank Professor McKnight, George Martinez, and Sam Olchyk for their comments on an
early draft of this article. I would also like to thank Bill Reynolds for his insights and
suggestions.
1. Nicholas Kulish & Tom Herman, Treasury to Issue Notice to Eliminate New Tax
Shelter, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2000, at A2.
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volved in selling, marketing, and participating in the tax shelters.2 On
February 28, 2000, the Treasury Department released temporary and pro-
posed regulations generally requiring promoters to register confidential
corporate tax shelters and to maintain lists of investors. 3
In March 2001, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York issued an opinion in a case involving corporate tax
shelters, Diversified Group, Inc. v. Daugerdas,4 (Daugerdas), that bears
some resemblance to The Highwayman's Case although, unlike The
Highwayman's Case, the parties in the tax case were not charged with any
crimes and it appears that no crimes were committed.5 In this brief article,
I will discuss The Highwayman's Case and then the recent opinion in
Daugerdas. I think the reader will quickly identify the similarities.
II. THE HIGHWAYMAN'S CASE
The Highwayman's Case is the name generally given to the case of
Everet v. Williams. The bill was filed in the Equity side of the Excheq-
uer.6 John Everet, of the Parish of St. James's, Clerkenwell, and Joseph
Williams of Middlesex were the parties. The bill was apparently filed
before 1725 but the orders were given in 1725.
The bill recites an oral partnership between the plaintiff (Everet) and
the defendant (Williams). The plaintiff was "skill [sic] in dealing, and in
buying and selling several sorts of commodities, such as corn, hay, straw,
horses, cows, sheep, oxen, hogs, wool, lambs, butter, cheese, plate, rings,
watches, canes, swords, and several other commodities."' 7 Pursuant to the
oral partnership, the parties "went on and proceeded jointly in the said
2. See generally Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance,
Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54
SMU L. REv. 47 (2001) (disclosure of tax shelters and penalties for non-disclosure and
failure on the merits may be the appropriate solution to curbing aggressive tax shelters).
3. T.D. 8877,65 Fed. Reg. 11205 (Mar. 2, 2000); T.D. 8876, 65 Fed. Reg. 11215 (Mar.
2, 2000); T.D. 8875, 65 Fed. Reg. 11211 (Mar. 2, 2000). These regulations have been
amended twice since their issuance.
4. 139 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The Daugerdas case was filed on February 2,
2000, shortly before the release of the temporary and proposed regulations requiring
disclosure.
5. The IRS has raised the possibility of criminal sanctions in certain corporate tax
shelters. For example, in I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255, the IRS describes a
transaction in which a taxpayer purchases and writes options and purports to create posi-
tive basis in a partnership interest by transferring the option positions to a partnership.
The promoters of this transaction take the position that the taxpayer's basis in the partner-
ship interest is increased by the cost of the purchased call options but is not reduced as a
result of the partnership's assumption of the taxpayer's obligation with respect to the writ-
ten call options. As a result, the taxpayer can dispose of the partnership interest and claim
a tax loss. The IRS concluded that the loss from this transaction is not a bona fide loss
reflecting actual economic consequences and, as a result, is not deductible. The IRS also
stated that criminal penalties may be appropriate under the tax code and other provisions
of federal law in cases where attempts are made to conceal the transaction through use of a
grantor trust and improper netting of the capital gains and losses of the grantor trust are
made.
6. The Bill has been reproduced in its entirety at 11 The European Magazine, and
London Review 360-63 (May 1787) [hereinafter European Magazine].
7. Id. at 361.
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dealings with good success on Hounslow-Heath, where they dealt with a
gentleman for a gold watch."8 The bill further recites that the defendant
indicated to the plaintiff "that Finchley in the said county of Middlesex
was a good and convenient place to deal in ... and that the said com-
modities were very plenty at Finchley." 9 The defendant noted that if they
were to deal in Finchley, "it would be almost all gain to them."10 The
parties "dealt with several gentlemen for divers watches, rings, swords,
canes, hats, cloaks, horses, bridles, saddles, and other things to the value
of £200 and upwards."'" The parties also discussed "a gentleman at
Blackheath, who had a good horse, bridle, saddle, watch, sword, cane,
and other things to dispose of, all of which . .. they might have for little
or no money;... in case they could prevail on the said gentlemen to part
with the said things."' 2 After "some small discourse" with the said gen-
tleman, the parties obtained the items "at a very cheap rate."'1 3 The bill
further recites that the parties' joint dealings also took place in Bagshot,
Salisbury, Hampstead, and other places in amounts up to and in excess of
£2,000.14 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant would not fairly ac-
count for the profits of the oral partnership with the plaintiff and, as a
result, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for an accounting
of the profits.' 5
On October 3, 1725, upon the motion of counsel for the defendant, the
bill was referred for scandal and impertinence. 16 On November 13, the
bill was dismissed with costs to be paid by the counsel who signed it.' 7
On November 29, the report of the bill as scandalous and impertinent was
confirmed, and an order was issued to attach the bodies of William White
and William Wreathcock, the solicitors for the plaintiff.18 On December
6, White and Wreathcock were each fined £50 and committed to the cus-
tody of the Warden of the Fleet until the fines were paid. 19 Jonathan
Collins, the counsel who signed the bill, was ordered to pay the costs. 20
The plaintiff was executed at Tyburn in 1730, and the defendant was exe-
cuted at Maidstone in 1727.21 Wreathcock, one of the solicitors for the









15. Id. at 362-63.
16. European Magazine, supra note 6, at 364.
17. Notes, The Highwayman's Case (Everet v. Williams), 9 L.Q.R. 197, 198 (July 1893).






III. DIVERSIFIED GROUP, INC. V. DAUGERDAS2 3
Diversified Group, Inc. ("DGI") develops and markets corporate tax
shelters.2 4 It is not a licensed accounting firm nor is it a law firm. Paul
Daugerdas is a certified public accountant and licensed attorney in Illi-
nois. A majority of Daugerdas' work involved rendering legal opinions
on tax strategies. Prior to 1994, Daugerdas was employed by a national
accounting firm. From 1994 to 1998, Daugerdas was a partner in a law
firm. He changed law firms in December 1998, to become the head of the
structured investment practice at his new firm.25
Daugerdas and James Haber, president of DGI, had known each other
for ten years. On several occasions in 1992, Haber sent Daugerdas mater-
ials describing various financial products that DGI was marketing. Haber
expressed his belief to Daugerdas that the materials would be kept
confidential. 26
In March 1995, Daugerdas agreed to evaluate a tax strategy developed
by DGI involving foreign tax credits. 27 Daugerdas signed a confidential-
ity agreement with DGI. The confidentiality agreement permitted
Daugerdas to present the tax strategy to prospective clients as long as
those clients signed a confidentiality agreement. If the prospective client
decided to utilize the tax strategy, DGI would be fairly compensated.2 8
In November 1996, Daugerdas and his law firm were engaged by Ha-
ber and DGI as its attorneys in connection with commercial, corporate,
and federal income tax issues associated with DGI's Alternative Long-
Term Financing Strategy ("ALFS"). 2 9  This engagement required
Daugerdas to maintain the confidentiality of information received from
DGI, "except to the extent DGI consented to the contrary, or as neces-
sary to carry out [its] representation or as required by the ethical rules
governing lawyers or by applicable law. '' 30 DGI could terminate the rela-
tionship at any time and its materials would be returned.3'
Daugerdas was permitted to introduce the ALFS to other parties. If
Daugerdas introduced a prospective client to the ALFS, he was entitled
to 50 percent of DGI's net profits on the transaction. If, however,
Daugerdas simply gave a tax opinion on an ALFS transaction, he was
entitled to only one-half of one percent of the size of the particular
transaction. 32
23. 139 F. Supp. 2d 445; a second action filed by Jenkens & Gilchrist, Daugerdas'
current employer, against DGI was consolidated with the first action of DGI against
Daugerdas.
24. Id. at 448.
25. Id. at 448-49.
26. Id. at 449.
27. Id.
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At the time of the engagement in November 1996, DGI sent materials
to Daugerdas regarding the ALFS. Two months later, Daugerdas sent a
letter to Haber detailing his comments on the ALFS. From November
1996 until October 1999, DGI alleged that it acted and communicated
with the belief that Daugerdas was its attorney. 33 DGI also alleged that
its relationship with Daugerdas "represented a valid contractual under-
standing" between them.34 Pursuant to this contractual understanding,
once Daugerdas evaluated one of DGI's tax strategies, he was prohibited
from marketing that strategy without compensating DGI or obtaining its
consent. Any profits that Daugerdas earned were to be shared equally
with DGI. In addition, DGI promised to make its clients aware that
Daugerdas would give a tax opinion letter on the transaction. Haber con-
tends "the parties' obligations under this oral contract were reiterated
each time a new strategy was developed. 35
The court then describes two different tax strategies utilized by DGI
and Daugerdas: (1) the option partnership strategy ("OPS") and (2) the
short-sale strategy.36 Under the OPS, a taxpayer purchases and writes
options and transfers these options to a partnership to create a substantial
increase in basis in the partnership interest.37 Under the short-sale strat-
egy, a taxpayer "borrows a treasury security, sells the security short, and
then contributes the proceeds to a partnership in exchange for a partner-
ship interest. '38 DGI claimed that it developed the OPS in 1998 and that
it spent "hundreds of hours of professional time developing it."3
9
Haber informed Daugerdas of the OPS sometime in 1998. According
to Haber, Daugerdas agreed to help evaluate the OPS from a tax stand-
point, and, in addition, "develop and market the strategy in accordance
with their prior practice and the terms of the contractual understand-
ing."'40 Daugerdas marketed the short-sale strategy from 1991 until Octo-
ber 1999. In October 1999, Congress issued proposed legislation
effectively ending the short-sale strategy. As a result, beginning in Octo-
ber 1999, Daugerdas began to utilize the OPS for his clients even though
Daugerdas had informed his clients in 1995 or 1996 "that they could sub-
stitute options for the short-sale of securities and achieve the same tax
result. '' 41 Daugerdas "implemented the OPS for the 'benefit of dozens of
clients' without compensating DGI or obtaining its consent."'42
DGI in its complaint against Daugerdas alleged (1) breach of fiduciary
duty, (2) breach of contract, and (3) unjust enrichment. 43 Daugerdas
33. 139 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 450-51.
37. Id. at 450. See supra note 5 (the OPS appears to be the subject of Notice 2000-44).
38. 139 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
39. Id. at 450-51.
40. Id. at 451.
41. Id. at 451.
42. Id.
43. 139 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
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moved for summary judgment. The court held that a fact issue existed as
to whether DGI provided Daugerdas with confidential information giving
rise to an attorney-client relationship and therefore a fiduciary duty.44
The court also held that even if the OPS was not a "confidence" or "se-
cret" when disclosed by DGI to Daugerdas, Daugerdas's use of the
materials given him by DGI for evaluation of legal issues in his indepen-
dent marketing of the OPS could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.45
As a result, the court denied Daugerdas' motion for summary judgment
with respect to DGI's claim of breach of fiduciary duty. On the second
claim of breach of "contractual understanding," the court held that the
claim was barred by New York's statute of frauds.46 On the third claim of
"unjust enrichment," the court held that to the extent that this claim was
based on the alleged oral agreement, it was barred by the statute of
frauds, and, to the extent that it was based upon Daugerdas alleged
breach of fiduciary duties, it was duplicative of that claim. 47 As a result,
the third claim was dismissed.
The court scheduled a conference for April 13, 2001.48 The case was
closed on October 3, 2001.
IV. CONCLUSION
An overwhelming number of corporate tax shelters are considered
abusive, and the entire business of marketing them is considered to be an
area of low prestige that garners little to no respect.49 It really is amazing
to see parties involved in developing and marketing corporate tax shel-
ters going to court over a dispute involving fees in selling corporate tax
shelters and asking the court to resolve the dispute-almost as amazing
as two highwaymen asking the court to account for the profits of their
partnership.
44. Id. at 445, 452-58.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 445, 458-60.
47. Id. at 445, 460-61.
48. Id. at 461.
49. See generally Canellos, supra note 2, at 56 ("It is inconceivable that a practitioner
who specialized in tax shelters would ever reach a position of responsibility in these [the
New York State Bar Association and similar] organizations."); Joseph Bankman, The Busi-
ness Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU L. REV. 149, 150 ("The opinion
writers [of corporate tax shelters] lose (or never have) professional reputation; Most mem-
bers and leaders of the New York State Bar Association regard the shelter phenomenon as
deplorable.").
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